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ABSTRACT
MICHELLE SMOLER: Informal Institutions and Elite Corruption in Young
Democracies
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova.)
Over the last century the world has seen several waves of democratization in the devel-
oping world. Despite expectations, the quality of these democracies has in many cases
disappointed citizens and political onlookers alike. Rather than resulting in accountable
and responsive governance, many countries still report high levels of corruption, lower-
ing voters’ trust and satisfaction with democracy. Research has sought to explain why
democratic success or backsliding varies across countries, but has focused largely on
formal institutions and their ability to constrain behavior, neglecting the role of informal
rules and norms in influencing elite corruption in the long term. I argue that the quality
of democratic governance following transition depends on the legacy of authoritarian-
era informal institutions. When ex-authoritarian elites assume positions of power under
democracy, they reproduce the informal rules and norms that structured their past be-
havior. To the extent that these rules and norms support democracy, elites will pursue
accountable governing practices. More often, however, authoritarian-era informal insti-
tutions are incompatible with democratic principles and will encourage elites to engage
in corrupt, non-accountable behavior. I test my argument using a cross-sectional time
series, focusing on young democracies in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. I find that
informal institutions are an essential component in explaining quality of governance in
young democracies.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last century the world has seen several waves of democratization in the
developing world. Despite expectations, the quality of these democracies has in many
cases disappointed citizens and political onlookers alike. Rather than resulting in ac-
countable and responsive governance, many countries still report high levels of cor-
ruption, lowering voters’ trust and satisfaction with democracy. Research has sought
to explain why democratic success or backsliding varies across countries, but has fo-
cused largely on formal institutions and their ability to constrain behavior, neglecting
the role of informal rules and norms in influencing elite corruption in the long term.
Scholars expected that the introduction of democracy to a regime would raise qual-
ity of governance while lowering levels of corruption. Formal institutions such as elec-
tions and party systems create incentives for accountable governance. Recent evi-
dence has shown, however, that while popular pressures and formal institutional con-
straints can, at their best, serve as effective checks on the abuse of power, they do
not eliminate opportunities for elites to pursue narrower interests. The question of if
and when elites take advantage of these opportunities requires a broader consider-
ation of the factors that influence elite decision-making. In conjunction with written
rules and laws, informal institutions build a foundation of common expectations among
elites. If informal institutions encourage elites to pursue their goals outside the public
eye in ways that limit the redistribution of rents or enable extraction of state resources
for private gain, elites may choose to violate democratic rules and engage in non-
accountable, corrupt behavior.
Young democracies are a unique case — regime transition presents an opportu-
nity for institutional development and the restructuring of rules and norms to support
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democracy. Democratic transitions may be precipitated internally or externally, but they
are generally accompanied by an elite interest in reorienting institutions toward demo-
cratic principles and formalizing political activity so that it may be monitored and sub-
mitted to public scrutiny. Even so, corruption often remains central to elite interactions:
why? Although transitions often result in radical institutional change, they do not con-
stitute tabula rasa for these countries — the authoritarian past prevails. In this paper, I
argue that the reproduction of authoritarian-era political elites through democratic tran-
sition results in the reproduction of authoritarian-era informal institutions, which both
undermine the legitimacy of democracy’s accountability mechanisms and provide al-
ternative incentives for elites to engage in corruption and generally non-accountable
behavior.
Existing scholarship on authoritarian legacies shows that the reproduction of
authoritarian-era elites can have many effects on democratic consolidation; however
most focus on how allowing incumbent elites to participate in constitutional design
and institutional development influences what kind of formal institutions emerge after
transition. Corruption is often seen as an outcome of these institutional legacies, but
corruption may also be a result of elite reproduction itself. Informal institutions survive
only with ongoing recognition — if democratic institutions are not strong enough to
hold elites accountable and/or provide effective “by the book” avenues for achieving
political objectives, such elites are likely to continue practicing politics in line with well-
known and mutually understood norms and expectations from the authoritarian regime.
Corruption in young democracies results, in part, from informal institutions remaining
active but unchanged due to the treatment of ex-authoritarian elites during transition.
I contribute to the literature on corruption by providing a more comprehensive pic-
ture of the institutional environment that shapes elite decision-making following demo-
cratic transition. While informal institutions are prominent in discussions of elite behav-
ior, we have yet to see informal rules and norms integrated into theories of democratic
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consolidation and quality of governance. The incorporation of informal rules and norms
is a necessary extension to discussions of democratization and corruption. Democratic
transitions are critical moments for institutional change — by focusing on formal institu-
tional development, we only have half the story. In addition to theoretical contributions,
this study provides a unique quantitative application of informal rules and norms that
illustrates their interaction with formal institutions on a broad scale.
In Section 2 of this paper, I will explore corruption, its causes, and relationship to
democracy. In Section 3, I will discuss institutional legacies of authoritarianism and
the role of elite reproduction in shaping democratic trajectories. I will then present a
theory of elite corruption in young democracies based on the reproduction of infor-
mal authoritarian-era institutions. I establish expectations regarding which unwritten
rules and norms are incompatible with democratic accountability mechanisms, and
how these formal and informal institutions interact to shape patterns of elite corruption.
In Section 4, I introduce quantified indicators for the variables of interest. In Section 5,
I test my hypotheses using two cross-sectional time series regression models. I then
review the statistical results of the models, and evaluate my hypotheses regarding the
reproduction of authoritarian-era informal institutions and their impact on corruption in
young democracies. I show that the informal institutions that emerge under democracy
are an outcome of informal institutions from the authoritarian period. I also find that
quality of these informal institutions shapes patterns of elite corruption in the years fol-
lowing democratic transition. In Section 6, I conduct robustness tests, confirming and
corroborating my findings.
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DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTION
Political institutions and social checks shape quality of governance and patterns
of corruption by promoting or hindering accountability. Accountability refers to con-
straints on the government’s use of political power, and involves external mechanisms
for the monitoring and oversight of elite activities as well as the imposition of sanc-
tions for undesirable behavior (Schedler 1999; Lu¨hrmann et al. 2017). Three types
of accountability are commonly discussed: vertical, horizontal, and diagonal. Verti-
cal accountability reflects citizens’ ability to monitor and shape elite decision-making
through active participation in elections and political parties. Horizontal accountability
describes the relationship among government institutions and the extent to which they
are able to monitor and constrain each other’s activities. Diagonal accountability, a
newer concept, deals with the “oversight function of non-state actors such as media
and civil society” (Lu¨hrmann et al. 2017)
Historically, scholars argued that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy
would produce better quality governance and, therefore, less corruption, due to the
adoption of institutions designed to hold leaders accountable. Democratic mechanisms
of vertical accountability such as political competition associated with free and fair elec-
tions should discourage corruption, because politicians are subject to the voters’ will
and can be replaced should they engage in illicit behavior. Democratic institutions
should also discourage corruption through horizontal mechanisms of accountability by
monitoring elite practices and exacting sanctions for corrupt behavior. Furthermore,
a free and independent media can monitor and constrain elite practices by exposing
corrupt behavior to the public. Given these expectations, scholars predicted that any
amount of democracy would decrease corruption and increase quality of governance.
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The relationship between democracy and corruption, however, is not so simple or lin-
ear. Empirically, we often find that democracy and poor quality governance go hand-
in-hand (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009). In particular, countries that have
recently undergone democratic transition tend to experience higher levels of corruption
than under authoritarian rule.
Recent research shows that democracy in and of itself does not ensure good quality
governance; rather, for democracy to reduce corruption, political institutions and mech-
anisms of accountability must be enforceable. McMann et al. (2017) find a curvilinear
relationship between democracy and corruption that depends on the strength of verti-
cal accountability mechanisms — the level of basic civil liberties such as freedom of
expression and freedom of association, in conjunction with free and fair elections — as
well as horizontal accountability mechanisms in the form of effective judicial constraints
on the executive. In line with these findings, Ba¨ck (2008) similarly argues that the
state’s administrative capacity shapes the extent to which democratic institutions are
enforceable and therefore effective in constraining corruption. Young democracies in
particular are prone to higher levels of corruption because when authoritarian regimes
transition to democracy, the restructuring of political and social institutions weakens the
state’s ability to monitor corruption; at the same time, democratic institutions are too
weak for citizens to monitor and constrain corruption effectively from below. Pellegata
(2009) also finds that quality of governance in democracies depends on the country’s
level and cumulative length of time exposed to democracy — younger democracies
tend to experience more corruption compared to older democracies where democratic
institutions are entrenched and thus capable of holding elites accountable. Overall,
findings show that democratic mechanisms of accountability only promote good qual-
ity governance and mitigate corruption when elites expect to be sanctioned for violating
institutional rules and norms of democracy.
However, formal democratic institutions are not the only rules of the game. A de-
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veloping literature on informal institutions shows that unwritten rules and norms play
an important role in shaping elite decision-making and quality of governance. Helmke
(2004) define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are
created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (728).
O’Donnell (2006) describes informal institutions as common knowledge, such that in-
teractions occur among elites with mutually understood and shared expectations, and
deviation or failure to adhere to the rules incurs some form of punishment. Even if
these rules are impenetrably opaque to outsiders, they are clear to relevant actors.
O’Donnell also discusses how elites may shift between formal and informal rules de-
pending on contexts, in one breath adhering to official constraints on political activity,
and in another, perhaps, engaging in corruption. Given the importance of informal insti-
tutions in shaping elite behavior, it is essential that we consider their role in promoting
or hindering corruption.
Informal institutions shape elite behavior in different ways depending on how com-
patible they are with formal institutional goals, and how strong they are relative to
formal institutions (Helmke 2004; Grzymala-Busse 2010). Informal institutions that
are compatible with democratic outcomes will support accountable political prac-
tices whereas informal institutions incompatible with democratic outcomes will under-
mine mechanisms of accountability and reinforce corrupt behavior. Chile’s executive-
legislative power-sharing mechanism is an example of an informal institution compat-
ible with democratic outcomes — political actors developed informal mechanisms to
incentivize multi-party cooperation despite a constitution that designates substantial
power to the executive (Helmke 2004).
On the other hand, informal institutions such as predation and patrimonialism tend
to be incompatible with democratic outcomes and incentivize corrupt behavior. Preda-
tion is the political practice of extracting state resources without targeting or delivering
goods to citizens, and without tolerating opposition. Patrimonialism is defined as “a
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system of government administration in which management personnel are responsi-
ble only to the political leadership, and where government jobs are treated as income
producing personal assets” (Brinkerhoff 2002; Bratton 1997). Predatory and patrimo-
nial rules and norms are widespread in the developing world, such as Latin America,
sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union, where informal practices regularly
outweigh formal laws and constraints in structuring political behavior (Gel’man 2012;
Helmke 2006; Bratton 2007). They undermine mechanisms of democratic account-
ability such as political participation and competition, rule of law, and cross-institutional
checks on elite behavior. At the same time, they support an environment where corrup-
tion is itself informally institutionalized; Darden (2008) shows that state leaders often
authorize corruption as informal payment in exchange for politicians’ compliance. For
example, norms of corruption in post-war Italy were so powerful that actors were more
likely to expect punishment for challenging “the conventions of the illicit market” than
for violating formal state law (Helmke 2004). Given the prevalence of informal rules
and norms that are largely incompatible with democratic principles of accountability,
and in practice hinder the effectiveness of democratic institutions in constraining elite
behavior, we must consider them a key component in understanding patterns of elite
corruption under democracy.
In addition to compatibility, formal institutional strength influences the extent to
which informal institutions play a substantial role in elite decision-making. Accord-
ing to (Helmke 2004), if formal institutions of democracy are weak, compatible informal
institutions may provide a useful substitute for formal mechanisms of accountability,
while incompatible informal institutions likely subvert democracy leading to corruption
and lower quality governance. For example, Taylor (1992) shows that in the absence
of formal electoral incentive structures for constituent service behavior in Costa Rica,
party leaders used patronage and career incentives to encourage elites to deliver pork
and other excludable goods as a means to build voter support. Conversely, if formal
democratic rules and norms are widespread and highly enforceable, incentives for ac-
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countable governance will likely outweigh informal incentives to engage in corruption.
Grzymala-Busse (2008) shows how in many cases democratic transition introduced
rent distribution, political competition, and elections, encouraging elites to invest in
democratic institutions that promote accountability, thereby raising the cost of extract-
ing state resources for personal gain.
If we expect compatible informal institutions to support quality governance even
when formal institutions of democracy are weak, and incompatible informal institutions
to undermine quality governance to some extent even when formal institutions are
strong, we can derive a set of preliminary hypotheses regarding elite corruption in
democracies.
Preliminary hypothesis 1: When informal institutions are compatible with formal
institutions of democracy:
a. Weak formal institutions correspond to average levels of corruption (H1a).
b. Strong formal institutions correspond to low levels of corruption (H1b).
Preliminary hypothesis 2: When informal institutions are incompatible with formal
institutions of democracy:
a. Weak formal institutions correspond to high levels of corruption (H2a).
b. Strong formal institutions correspond to average levels of corruption (H2b).
Table 1: Preliminary hypotheses: levels of corruption
formal democratic institutions
in
fo
rm
al
in
st
.
weak strong
compatible average (H1a) low (H1b)
incompatible high (H2a) average (H2b)
These hypotheses, however, only partially explain the story of corruption in post-
transition democracies. Democratic transition tends to be a period characterized by
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dramatic institutional change — a critical juncture of sorts — where entrenched insti-
tutions are destabilized and opportunities for establishing new institutional trajectories
emerge (Capoccia 2007). In order to understand why some transitions support demo-
cratic consolidation and good quality governance while others falter, we must consider
when and why incompatible informal institutions emerge. Transitions vary in the com-
pleteness of institutional transformation toward democracy — some are more suc-
cessful in achieving a break from the past, while others are burdened with legacies of
the authoritarian regime. While an extensive literature on authoritarian legacies exists,
few consider the long-term effect of informal institutions on elite behavior. In the next
section, I explore institutional legacies of authoritarianism in post-transition democra-
cies. I then argue that the reproduction of authoritarian-era elites through democratic
transition results in the reproduction of authoritarian-era informal institutions. Thus the
extent to which authoritarian-era informal institutions support undemocratic behavior
will influence the consolidation of democracy in terms of quality of governance and
corruption.
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AUTHORITARIAN LEGACIES AND ELITE REPRODUCTION
In this section, I discuss legacies of authoritarianism and how elite reproduction
during democratic transition serves as a central mechanism for shaping institutional
development, formal and informal.
The collapse of authoritarian rule and the adoption of democracy presents an op-
portunity for dramatic institutional change to occur, but complete democratic transfor-
mation requires a break from the past. Unfortunately, democratic transition is often
marred by legacies of authoritarianism, which influence the trajectory of democratic
development. For example, research shows that the continuation of authoritarian-era
parties into democracy affects the quality of party system institutionalization and demo-
cratic competition (Roberts 1999; Ishiyama 2006). Costa Pinto (2006) finds that post-
transition political culture in Portugal was largely a consequence of the authoritarian
regime’s institutional legacy. Hite (2004) citeps a wide range of authoritarian institu-
tional legacies including authoritarian laws, weak rule of law, a non-autonomous judi-
ciary, and large public sectors under state control, each of which undermines demo-
cratic consolidation. Pop-Eleches (2013) find that the number of years an individual
spent under communism is inversely related to their civic participation, such that those
individuals who spent many years under communist rule, or who experienced commu-
nism in their formative years, were much less likely to engage in civic participation in
the post-communist era.
The reproduction of authoritarian-era elites, too, has significant implications for a
country’s democratic trajectory. If transitions privilege ex-authoritarian elites, then their
interests play a role in institutional design and implementation (O’Donnell et al. 1986).
Scholars posit that when incumbent elites have significant involvement in institutional
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design, democratic institutions will be adopted more slowly and less comprehensively.
Research on post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe indicates that the absence
of a strong political opposition at the time of transition resulted at times in incomplete
consolidation of democratic institutions and practices (Vachudova 2005). Power (1996)
argues that where elites’ “experience and socialization [under authoritarianism] were
largely characterized by clientelism and membership in marginal or quasi-fictional rep-
resentative bodies” they are less committed to building effective representative institu-
tions in the post-transition period, which diminishes the quality of the new democracy.
He concludes that the reproduction of such authoritarian-era elites through democratic
transition will likely undermine the quality of democratic institutions. Similarly, when a
democratic transition privileges ex-authoritarian elites by granting them amnesty from
transitional justice or involving them in constitutional design and institutional devel-
opment, formal institutions are more likely to include loopholes, or ambiguities that
reproduce elite exceptionalism and weaken mechanisms of democratic accountability
(Stepan 1988; Agu¨ero 1998). For example, the pacted transitions from military rule
in Brazil produced lower quality governance because ex-authoritarian elites built “un-
democratic military prerogatives” into the 1998 constitution (Zaverucha 1998).
Evidence shows that elite reproduction plays an important role in shaping the devel-
opment of formal institutions during and after regime transition. I extend this argument
to include informal rules and norms, which only survive with on-going recognition, and
therefore depend on elite reproduction to continue into democracy. As Lauth (2000)
states:
... informal institutions are based on auto-licensing (that is, self-enactment
and subsequent self-assertion). Whilst the nature of formal institutions can
be shaped and changed by actors with rule-making authority, this is not the
case with informal institutions, as these develop, so to speak, indigenously.
They do not possess a centre which directs and coordinates their actions.
If their actual recognition lapses, so does their existence with it ...
When political elites from the authoritarian retain positions of power in democratic gov-
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ernance, they return to the mutually understood and well-known practices that shaped
their relationships with other political actors. As a result, informal institutions under
democracy will be less compatible with democracy, and compete with formal demo-
cratic institutions in structuring elite behavior. When formal democratic institutions are
weak, informal institutions will serve as the primary means for achieving political goals.
To the extent that authoritarian-era institutions supported corruption, predation, patri-
monialism, and other practices that permit or even incentivize elites to extract state
resources for private gain, these institutions will continue to structure elite behavior
under democracy, resulting in low levels of accountability and high levels of corruption.
When formal democratic institutions are strong, they can constrain corruption signifi-
cantly, but not entirely, as informal rules and norms that support corrupt and subversive
behavior still exist. We can now revisit the hypotheses from the Section ??, with an
additional contribution:
Hypothesis 1: Authoritarian-era informal institutions shape the quality of informal
institutions that emerge following democratic transition.
Hypothesis 2: Post-transition informal institutions shape patterns of corruption on
the basis of their compatibility with democracy.
When authoritarian-era informal institutions are compatible with formal institu-
tions of democracy:
a. Weak formal institutions result in average levels of corruption.
b. Strong formal institutions result in low levels of corruption.
When authoritarian-era informal institutions are incompatible with formal institutions of
democracy:
c. Weak formal institutions result in high levels of corruption
d. Strong formal institutions result in average levels of corruption.
While transitions vary in their treatment of ex-authoritarian elites, elite reproduc-
tion is fairly common. Research shows that in post-Communist Central and Eastern
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Europe, for example, a considerable reservoir of elites come from the old nomen-
klatura, virtually all of which previously held top positions under communist rule, and
include members of the former state police that engaged in severe forms of repression
during the communist period. In a 1995 study of elite recruitment in post-communist
Eastern Europe, Szelenyi (1995) found that there was a limited outflow of the old
nomenklatura in Russia, Hungary, and Poland — five years after the collapse of the
Soviet Union many of them still occupied influential positions in government. Replace-
ment of old elites was more substantial in Hungary than in the other two countries, but
the speed of transformation was slowed by the election of the Socialist Party in 1994.
The authors argue that transformation from Communism is unlikely to be revolution-
ary in nature, and that attempts at greater transformation will be met with “trajectory
correction” (622).
Similarly in Latin America, Frantz (2016) show that when dictators attach their
rule to a traditional party, or repress the traditional party so as to create a new one,
the elites that participate in the authoritarian regime return to play a significant role in
politics after democratic transition. In Brazil, the political parties created by the mili-
tary regime “produced the first two post-authoritarian presidents... and its members
controlled close to 40 percent of the seats of the National Congress under democ-
racy” (Power 1997). Political actors in new democracies are not only composed of
opposition groups or “new elites” but also of high-ranking and mid-level members of
the former regime. We see that among new democracies, even across geographic
regions, ex-authoritarian elites play a substantial role in politics, influencing the trajec-
tory of democracy and quality of governance. This study is therefore highly relevant to
discussions of democratic transition and consolidation.
13
Table 2: Hypotheses: corruption in young democracies
formal democratic institutions
in
fo
rm
al
in
st
.
weak strong
compatible average (H2a) low (H2b)
incompatible high (H2c) average (H2d)
In the next section I will discuss how best to operationalize elite reproduction,
authoritarian-era informal institutions, and formal institutions of democracy for the pur-
pose of quantitative analysis.
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OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS
In this section, I discuss measures for the key concepts outlined in the frame-
work above. I run my analysis on an cross-sectional time-series dataset composed
of 58 country-cases across Europe, Latin America, and Africa that underwent demo-
cratic transition between 1960 and 2000. I determine the moment of transition using
the Polity IV Project’s regime transitions data. Major democratic transitions are defined
as a six-point increase or more in Polity score over a period of three years or less,
constituting a transition from autocracy to partial or full democracy, or a transition from
a partial to full democracy. Minor democratic transitions are defined as a three- to five-
point increase in Polity score over a period of three years or less, constituting a shift
to partial or full democracy (Polity IV 2015). I operationalize key variables using the
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset version 7.1.
Measuring informal institutions
Grzymala-Busse (2010) describes formal and informal institutions as serving
three basic functions: distributing resources, providing information, and constraining
individual behavior. Those informal institutions that support corruption will promote
private over public gains in the allocation of resources; they will encourage the use of
private information and personal networks in achieving desired outcomes; and they will
promote the exclusion of institutional or popular oversight to minimize potential costs
of undemocratic behavior. I collapse these functions into two dimensions that cap-
ture the extent to which informal institutions support or undermine accountability and
good governance: transparency/exclusivity and distribution/extraction. As we cannot
observe the unwritten rules and norms that influence elite behavior, I focus on various
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elite practices that reflect these theoretical dimensions. I construct an informal institu-
tions index using factor analysis on several indicators of transparency/exclusivity and
redistribution/extraction, which I discuss in greater detail below1 .
Elite Transparency/exclusivity dimension
Informal institutions support corruption by limiting transparency and participa-
tion, both of which are essential to vertical and horizontal accountability. I incorporate
three variables that measure the extent to which the elite decision-making environment
is transparent or exclusive. Descriptions of these variables can be found in Table 3.
These variables are derived from expert survey responses to questions designed to
address the deliberative (or non-deliberative) nature of a country’s politics, focusing on
the observed practices of national-level elites. This presents us with the opportunity
to measure the character of the elite decision-making environment at the microlevel.
Descriptions of these variables can be found in Table 3.
1 The directionality of the variables used in factor analysis has been reoriented to run from less to
more authoritarian to ensure consistency and facilitate interpretation.
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Table 3: Transparency/exclusivity dimension: variable descriptions
variable name description range of responses
reasoned
justification
extent to which elites
give public and rea-
soned justifications for
policy positions
sophisticated justifica-
tion→ no justification
range of
consultation
breadth of elites con-
sulted over important
policy changes
consultation across po-
litical and civil social
spectrum→ no consul-
tation
respect coun-
terarguments
extent to which elites
acknowledge and re-
spect counterarguments
in discussions over im-
portant policy changes
always acknowledge
counterarguments
→ counterarguments
prohibited
Source and Descriptions: Varieties of Democracy codebook version 7.1
High values reflect more authoritarian practices — no transparency regarding
policy decisions (reasoned justification), uniformity of political perspectives (respect
counterarguments), and a highly exclusive decision-making environment (range of
consultation). Low values reflect more democratic practices — transparency, a diver-
sity of perspectives, and inclusive decision-making process. In exploring the data (see
Table 4), we see that on average, elite practices across regions tend to fall somewhere
between democratic and authoritarian, offering some transparency and inclusiveness
but not without significant limitations. Comparing across regions, we see that Euro-
pean and Latin American cases exhibit less transparency and more exclusivity in their
decision-making processes than in African cases.
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Table 4: Transparency/exclusivity dimension: summary stats
region min max mean sd
reasoned justifi-
cation
Europe 0.96 6.27 3.28 1.21
Lat. Am. 0.48 6.06 3.40 1.30
Africa 1.02 3.98 2.47 0.94
respect counter-
arguments
Europe 0.20 5.97 3.59 1.61
Lat. Am. 0 5.66 2.75 1.33
Africa 0.60 2.82 1.93 0.65
range of consul-
tation
Europe 0 6.43 3.80 1.44
Lat. Am. 0.12 6.32 3.58 1.31
Africa 1.56 6.17 3.86 1.10
Rent Distribution and Extraction
Informal institutions also support corrupt behavior by creating opportunities for
private gain without regard for public interests, and by structuring elite competition
around the distribution of rents. To account for the distribution/extraction dimension
of informal institutions, I incorporate five variables measuring particularistic practices,
and abuse of power for private gain among members of government and their agents.
Descriptions of these variables can be found in Table 5.
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Table 5: Rent distribution/extraction dimension: variable descriptions
variable name description range of responses
common good
(v2dlcommon)
extent to which elites justify pol-
icy positions in terms of common
good
explicit justification for
common/greatest good →
no justification
particularistic or public
goods (v2dlencmps)
extent to which social and infras-
tructural spending are character-
ized as “particularistic” or ”public
goods”
mostly public goods →
mostly targeted goods
executive bribery
(v2exbribe)
frequency with which members
of the executive branch, or
agents of the executive grant fa-
vors in exchange for bribes, kick-
backs, or other material induce-
ments
hardly ever→ routinely
legislature corrupt
activities (v2lgcrrpt)
frequency with which members
of the legislature abuse position
for financial gain
hardly ever→ common
public sector corrupt
exchanges
(v2excrptps)
frequency with which public sec-
tor employees grant favors in ex-
change for bribes, kickbacks, or
other material inducements
hardly ever→ common
Source and Descriptions: Varieties of Democracy codebook version 7.1
Once again, high values reflect more authoritarian practices — extremely tar-
geted spending (particularistic or public goods) and catering to special interests (com-
mon good), as well as high incidence rates of bribery and abuse of power for private
gain (corruptions variables). Low values reflect more democratic practices — priori-
tizing public goods and public interests over private gain. Summary statistics in Table
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6 show that on average elite practices tend to fall somewhere in the middle, such that
public interest is not entirely neglected but targeted interests and personal gain more
often compel behavior. The one exception is in Europe, where the influence of com-
munism resulted in a greater emphasis on public rather than particularistic spending.
Table 6: Rent distribution/extraction dimension: summary stats
region min max mean sd
particularistic or public
goods
Europe 0.00 5.57 1.64 1.07
Lat. Am. 0.36 5.43 3.25 1.09
Africa 0.40 4.23 2.23 0.91
common good
Europe 0.00 5.56 2.64 1.12
Lat. Am. 0.20 6.15 3.02 1.37
Africa 0.95 4.79 2.68 0.95
executive bribery
Europe 0 5.18 2.35 1.15
Lat. Am. 0.18 5.58 3.40 1.21
Africa 0.41 4.99 3.25 1.21
legislature corrupt ac-
tivities
Europe 0.00 4.96 2.38 1.14
Lat. Am. 0.29 5.45 3.50 1.20
Africa 0.75 6.13 2.84 1.15
public sector corrupt
exchanges
Europe 0.00 5.36 3.05 1.15
Lat. Am. 0.86 5.27 3.22 1.07
Africa 1.18 5.50 3.74 0.97
Informal Institutions Index
I develop an index of informal institutions by running a principle factor analysis
on the above indicators across all country-years. From this index, I then calculate a
separate measure to capture the legacy of authoritarian-era informal institutions by
averaging pre-transition values of the index. I determine the length of the authoritarian
regime using Polity IV’s regime transitions data.
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The index measures the extent to which informal institutions are compatible with
democracy, in terms of promoting accountability and good governance. I confirm the
directionality of the index by comparing it to its component parts, which run from less
to more authoritarian2 .
Table 7: Comparison of component variables and informal inst. legacy
top 25th percentile bottom 25th percentile
transparency
& exclusivity
Bulgaria, Central African Republic,
Chile, Czech Republic, Greece,
Hungary, Mongolia, Paraguay,
Poland, Romania, Uruguay(2)
Argentina, Senegal,
Uruguay(1)
rent
distribution &
extraction
Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
Honduras, Paraguay
Albania, Cabo Verde, Esto-
nia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Moldova, Russia, Turkey,
Ukraine
informal
institutional
legacy
Bolivia, Bulgaria, Central African
Republic, Czech Republic, Domini-
can Republic, Greece, Guatemala,
Honduras, Italy, Ivory Coast, Nige-
ria, Panama, Paraguay, Romania
Albania, Argentina, Armenia,
Cabo Verde, Chile, Esto-
nia, Greece, Malawi, Mongo-
lia, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru, Poland, Por-
tugal, Senegal, Suriname,
Uruguay(1)
We see from Table 7 that those country-cases scoring high (more authoritarian)
on measures of transparency/exclusiveness and rent distribution/extraction also tend
to score high on the informal institutional legacy. The relationship is less obvious for
low-scoring countries; however, none of the country-cases in the top 25th percentile of
2 As the index is a weighted aggregation of the different component indicators, values of the compo-
nents will not correlate directly to values of the index.
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component variables scores in the bottom 25th percentile of the legacy and vice versa.
This provides us with a strong indication that directionality for the informal institutions
index is relatively consistent with that of its component parts, running from less to more
authoritarian, or said differently, from compatible to incompatible with democracy. This
will allow us to interpret the results more efficiently.
Table 8: Informal institutions: summary stats
region min max mean sd
informal institutional
legacy
Europe -1.39 1.92 0.59 0.68
Lat. Am. -2.21 3.32 0.73 1.23
Africa -1.29 1.89 0.52 0.91
post-transition informal
institutions index
Europe -3.44 2.22 -0.09 1.31
Lat. Am. -3.78 3.48 -0.02 1.46
Africa -2.47 2.22 0.14 1.02
Table 8 exhibits the summary statistics for the informal institutional legacy (the
country-average for authoritarian-era informal institutions), and the informal institutions
index for the post-transition period. We see a greater variation in informal institutional
compatibility in the post-transition period than under authoritarianism, indicating that
informal institutions of democracy have the potential to be highly compatible or highly
incompatible with democratic principles. The question is: does the informal institutional
legacy affect what kind of informal institutions emerge following transition? I will answer
this question in my analysis below.
Measuring formal democratic institutions
As previously discussed, formal democratic constraints on elite behavior affect
patterns of corruption in young democracies. I operationalize formal institutions using
V-Dem’s Accountability Index, a composite measure of horizontal, vertical and diago-
nal constraints on political elites’ use of power (Lu¨hrmann et al. 2017). This measure
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is specifically designed to capture the extent to which citizens, legislators, judges, the
media, and civil social actors are able to monitor and constrain the government. Direc-
tionality of the index runs from less to more democratic.
Table 9: Accountability index: summary stats
region min max mean sd
accountability index
Europe -0.32 1.97 1.22 0.51
Lat. Am. -0.35 1.99 0.94 0.48
Africa 0.02 1.58 0.83 0.36
As this is a relatively new index, I corroborate my findings using an alternative
specification of democratic constraints, in line with the McMann et al. study of democ-
racy and corruption discussed in Section 2.
Measuring political corruption
I operationalize elite corruption in young democracies using V-Dem’s political
corruption index, which aggregates indices for executive, legislative, judicial, and pub-
lic corruption (McMann et al. 2016). I also conduct robustness tests by running the
model on disaggregated institutional measures of corruption in the executive and leg-
islative branches. Each captures the extent to which political actors abuse their po-
sition for private gain. In separating measures of corruption by institutional level, we
can see how informal institutions differentially affect elite behavior depending on the
government body. We see from Table 10 that Europe has the lowest average levels of
corruption and Africa the highest, with Latin America falling in the middle.
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Table 10: Political corruption index: summary stats
region min max mean sd
political corruption index
Europe 0.07 0.93 0.41 0.24
Lat. Am. 0.03 0.89 0.52 0.24
Africa 0.16 0.94 0.63 0.20
Controls
In my earlier discussion of democracy and corruption, several factors were theo-
rized to impact post-transition institutional development and levels of corruption: state
capacity, opposition party strength, and national wealth. To control for state capac-
ity, I use the the Hanson and Sigman state capacity index, which captures a state’s
extractive, coercive, and administrative capacity. We see from Table 11 that state
capacity in Africa is much lower than in Europe and Latin America, such that the max-
imum value for capacity in Africa is less than the average value in Europe. I opera-
tionalize opposition party strength using V-Dem’s opposition party autonomy indicator
(v2psoppaut), which measures the extent to which opposition parties are independent
and autonomous from the executive.
Table 11: Controls: summary stats
region min max mean sd
state capacity
Europe -1.82 1.92 0.60 0.63
Lat. Am. -1.44 2.01 0.09 0.54
Africa -2.31 0.13 -0.96 0.41
opposition party au-
tonomy
Europe -0.97 3.02 1.94 0.89
Lat. Am. -0.58 3.04 1.82 0.62
Africa 0.16 2.82 1.14 0.70
I use an ordinal measure of wealth that organizes countries based on their GDP
per capita relative to the average GDP per capita for low, middle, or high-income coun-
tries.
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RESULTS & ANALYSIS
Hypothesis 1: informal institutional legacy
In my first hypothesis I posit that informal institutions from the authoritarian pe-
riod — a.k.a the informal institutional legacy — influence what kind of informal in-
stitutions emerge after democratic transition, and whether they are compatible or in-
compatible with democratic ideals of good governance and accountability. To test this
hypothesis I run a cross-section time series regression with random effects (due to
time-invariance on the legacy variable) on the following model:
informal inst. index ∼ informal inst. legacy + accountability index + state capacity
+ opposition party autonomy + GDP per capita (ordinal)
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Table 12: Informal institutional legacy (post-transition years 1-5)
Europe Latin America Africa
informal inst. legacy 0.40∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.40∗
(1.98) (5.71) (2.03)
oppos. party autonomy −0.26 0.04 −0.02
(−1.57) (0.18) (0.17)
accountability −1.69∗∗∗ −1.33∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(−5.27) (−5.67) (2.04)
capacity 0.13 0.20 −0.70∗∗∗
(1.50) (1.25) (−3.65)
low-mid income 0.52∗ 0.05 −0.12
(2.95) (0.11) (−1.38)
mid-high income 0 −0.05 0
(.) (−0.02) (.)
constant 1.08∗ ∗ ∗ 0 4.22∗∗∗
(2.88) (.) (−3.85)
N 96 73 56
w-in R2 0.06 0.32 0.36
between R2 0.83 0.88 0.28
overall R2 0.81 0.87 0.38
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Results from Table 12 offer support for the initial hypothesis that authoritarian-
era informal institutions affect the quality of informal institutions that emerge following
democratic transition. The average effect of the informal institutional legacy is in the
expected direction and significant at conventional levels across regions. Figure 1 de-
picts the linear relationship between the informal institutional legacy and post-transition
informal institutions. We see that a less authoritarian legacy corresponds to informal
institutions in the post-transition period that are more compatible with democracy. Sim-
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ilarly, a more authoritarian legacy corresponds to incompatible post-transition informal
institutions.
Fig. 1: The informal institutional legacy (post-transition years 1-5)
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
po
st
-tr
an
si
tio
n 
in
fo
rm
al
 in
st
.
-2.2 -1.7 -1.2 -.7 -.2 .3 .8 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.8
informal inst. legacy
weak constraints medium constraints strong constraints
Europe
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
po
st
-tr
an
si
tio
n 
in
fo
rm
al
 in
st
.
-2.2 -1.7 -1.2 -.7 -.2 .3 .8 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.8
informal inst. legacy
weak constraints medium constraints strong constraints
Latin America
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
po
st
-tr
an
si
tio
n 
in
fo
rm
al
 in
st
.
-2.2 -1.7 -1.2 -.7 -.2 .3 .8 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.8
informal inst. legacy
weak constraints medium constraints strong constraints
Africa
The average effect of accountability is also significant across regions, and runs
in the expected direction in Europe and Latin America, such that where constraints on
elite behavior are strong, the post-transition informal institutions are more compatible
with democracy. The effect is reversed in Africa, where stronger constraints result in
more authoritarian informal institutions. This likely results from how low state capacity
in Africa. We see from the results that state capacity has no effect on the quality of
informal institutions following transition in Europe and Latin America (where the distri-
bution of state capacity in the sample is about the same), but a strong and significant
negative effect in Africa; while state capacity in these countries is likely too low to
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make formal institutional mechanisms of accountability effective, an increase in state
capacity could support informal internal mechanisms of oversight and monitoring.
Looking at the controls for wealth and opposition strength, we see that the ef-
fect of moving from the low to lower-middle income bracket in Europe corresponds to
an increase in the informal institutions index, while opposition strength is insignificant
across regions.
Informal institutional legacy over time
I investigate the effect of the informal institutional legacy over time by rerun-
ning the analysis on post-transition periods 6-10 and 11-15. Results can be found in
the Appendix, Tables 14-16 I find that in Europe, the institutional legacy loses signifi-
cance after the first five years, but opposition strength becomes significant, exhibiting a
negative effect on the informal institutions index during years 6-10, which supports ex-
pectations; however the effect becomes positive Europe in years 11-15. Accountability
remains significant in the expected direction. The effect weakens slightly in years 6-10
but increases substantially in years 11-15. In Latin America, the informal institutional
legacy remains significant in the expected direction over time, but decreases in the
strength of its effect. In Africa, all effects loses significance over time, except for oppo-
sition strength, which has a negative effect on the informal institutions index in years
6-10. We must note, however, that these results are likely due to loss of observations
— only nine African country-cases have observations past 13 years due to their late
20th century transitions.
Hypothesis 2: informal institutions and corruption
I test the interactive effect of informal institutions and democratic constraints
in young democracies by running the following cross-sectional time series regression
with country-case fixed effects on the following model, limiting the time component to
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the first 15 years post-transition. I disaggregate the results by region to ensure that
one area of the world is not driving results.
political corruption index ∼ informal inst. index + accountability index + informal inst.
index*accountability index + state capacity + GDP per capita (ordinal)
Table 13: Corruption in young democracies (post-transition years 1-15)
Europe Latin America Africa
informal inst. index 0.23∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(21.39) (8.36) (12.80)
accountability 0.02 −0.01 −0.02
(1.09) (−0.93) (−1.10)
informal inst. index :
accountability
−0.07∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗
(−7.07) (2.80) (−6.02)
capacity −0.00 0.00 −0.04∗∗∗
(−0.18) (0.45) (−3.79)
low-mid income 0 0 0.00
(.) 0 (0.43)
mid-high income −0.02 −0.02∗ 0
(−1.95) (−2.45) (.)
constant 0.55∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(23.47) (38.48) (33.64)
N 322 264 152
w-in R2 0.79 0.72 0.77
between R2 0.86 0.84 0.45
overall R2 0.87 0.83 0.49
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05; t-statistics in parentheses
Results from Table 13 provide support for the argument that informal institutions affect
29
levels of corruption in young democracies. The informal institutions index is signif-
icant across regions. Surprisingly, the average effect of the accountability index is
insignificant, but a closer look at its relationship with informal institutions shows that
accountability does indeed affect levels of corruption.
State capacity is insignificant in Europe and Latin America but has a negative,
statistically significant effect on corruption in Africa. National wealth is significant in
Latin America, but in the opposite direction as expected, such that moving from low
income status — the base value — to lower-middle or upper-middle income status
increases levels of corruption. This is likely due to elites’ increased access to more
sizable rents.
The results from the regression do not provide us with enough information to
evaluate whether my expectations regarding the interaction of informal institutions and
democratic constraints hold up. In Figure 2 I plot predicted values of political corrup-
tion across the informal institutions index, controlling for the strength of democratic
constraints on behavior. All other variables are set at their means. My findings are
discussed below:
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Fig. 2: Effects of formal and informal institutions on corruption
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Africa
Compatible informal institutions
I find some support for hypothesis 2a: compatible informal institutions and weak
democratic constraints correspond to average levels of corruption in Latin America;
however, in Europe and Africa the same interaction results in low levels of corruption.
These effects are statistically significantly distinct from zero. I find more support for
hypothesis 2b: compatible informal institutions and strong constraints correspond to
low levels of corruption in Europe and Latin America, but high levels of corruption in
Africa.
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Incompatible informal institutions
In line with hypothesis 2c, I find that when democratic constraints are weak, in-
compatible informal institutions result in high levels of corruption. These results are
significant at conventional levels and consistent across regions. Evidence from Africa
supports hypothesis 2d: incompatible informal institutions and strong democratic con-
straints result in average levels of corruption, as expected. Against expectations, how-
ever, I find that strong democratic constraints do not mediate the substantial positive
effect of incompatible informal institutions on political corruption in Europe and Latin
America, with predicted values exceeding the maximum on the political corruption in-
dex.
Analysis and summary
To begin with, my findings show that the quality of authoritarian-era institutions
has a strong and significant impact on the quality of informal institutions that emerge
after democratic transition and that new formal institutions of democracy do a poor
job of mediating this effect. On the bright side, we see that the effect is short-lived
— in general, as democracy proceeds, formal democratic institutions more strongly
influence the nature of informal institutions, increasing their compatibility with democ-
racy. Secondly, my findings show that the extent to which informal institutions are
compatible with democracy is highly important when establishing expectations about
democratization and quality of governance. When informal institutions are compatible
with democracy, they can substitute for weak democratic constraints by incentivizing
good governance. If they are incompatible with democracy, they not only serve as a
counterweight, but in some cases overwhelm the effects of democratic constraints on
elite behavior, leading to high levels of corruption. Since the informal institutions that
emerge following democratic transition are often more incompatible with democracy,
these results help to explain high levels of corruption in young democracies. Overall, it
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is clear that greater attention must be paid to the role of informal institutions in shaping
political behavior in democracies.
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ROBUSTNESS TESTS
I conduct two sets of robustness tests: the first substitutes alternative measures
of democratic constraints (based on McMann’s recent study of democracy and corrup-
tion) for the accountability index in order to corroborate the results; the second utilizes
disaggregated measures of corruption to see how informal institutions and democratic
constraints affect elite behavior in different institutional environments.
Alternative specifications
In their article, McMann et al. show that free and fair elections, freedom of
association, and judicial constraints have a significant negative impact on corruption. I
run an alternative model, substituting for accountability V-Dem’s electoral component
index, which aggregates V-Dem indices for clean elections, freedom of association,
elected officials, and an indicator for the share of population with suffrage. I also add
V-Dem’s index for judicial constraints on the executive, which is an aggregate of various
indices that capture oversight capacity and independence of the judiciary (Coppedge
et al. 2017). Regression results can be found in the Appendix, Table 17.
Figure 3 compares the marginal effect of informal institutions on corruption
across values of democratic constraints using two different operationalizations of
democratic constraint.
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Fig. 3: Robustness test no. 1: informal institutions and corruption
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We see that the average effect of informal institutions on corruption is statistically sig-
nificant for both measures across regions. However, we do see that when we substitute
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in the electoral component index for the accountability index, the impact of democratic
constraints on the effect of informal institutions decreases. The direction of the effect
also remains consistent for both measures across regions. This evidence corrobo-
rates my findings regarding the impact of informal institutions on corruption in young
democracies.
Disaggregating corruption
I also test the model on V-Dem’s institutional-level measures of executive and
legislative corruption3 . Figure 4 depicts the marginal effect of informal institutions on
executive bribery on the left, and on legislature corrupt activities on the right.
Fig. 4: Robustness test no. 2: informal institutions and corruption
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3 These variables were also used as components in constructing the informal institutions in-
dex, but pairwise correlations between these measures of corruption and the index do not indicate
multicollinearity.
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We see that the average effect of the informal institutions index on executive
bribery and legislature corrupt activities is significant and positive in Europe and Latin
America; however the interaction of informal institutions with democratic constraints
differs between the two types of corruption. In the case of executive bribery, as demo-
cratic constraints increase in strength, so does the effect of informal institutions on
corrupt behavior. On the other hand, strong democratic constraints are able to ef-
fectively mediate the effect of informal institutions on corruption in the legislature. In
Africa, informal institutions have a negative effect on legislature corrupt activities when
democratic constraints are strong. These findings support Hypothesis 2, to the ex-
tent that they confirm the importance of informal institutions in shaping elite corruption,
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even among different government bodies. They also provide additional evidence that
incompatible informal institutions undermine quality of governance. More importantly,
however, they introduce questions for further research, such as “what explains the dif-
ference in the experiences of executive and legislative bodies when it comes to informal
institutions and corruption?”
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CONCLUSION
The emergence of new democracies has been a story of both hope and dis-
appointment. While many have developed into successful liberal democracies, many
more others have struggled to consolidate their democratic institutions and achieve
high quality governance. Elites continue to evade accountability and abuse their of-
fices for private gain. This study shows that the key to explaining such behavior in the
early years of democracy lies less with formal mechanisms of accountability and more
with informal rules and practices that shape elite incentives to engage either in good
governance or corruption. As institutions are difficult to change, we must consider how
the informal institutions that develop after democratic transition shape the long-term
trajectory of democratic development. Moving forward, we must expand the study of
informal institutions to explore their effects on other forms of political behavior, in partic-
ular, state capture. This practice, like corruption, involves the abuse of office for private
gain but more substantially undermines democracy by broadly corrupting the political
system. As more democracies backslide toward authoritarianism, I believe that this
line of inquiry will be essential in explaining when and why state capture occurs.
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APPENDIX
Table 14: Informal institutional legacy In Europe
over time
years 1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15
informal inst. legacy 0.40∗ 0.18 0.21
(1.98) (0.98) (0.82)
oppos. party autonomy −0.26 −0.40 0.38
(−1.57) (−2.60) (2.05)
accountability −1.69∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ −2.90∗∗∗
(−5.27) (−5.77) (−8.09)
capacity 0.13 −0.37∗∗∗ 0.07
(1.50) (−3.40) (0.39)
low-mid income 0.52∗ 1.58∗∗∗ 0
(2.95) (5.90) (.)
mid-high income 0 1.74∗∗∗ −0.39
(.) (−0.02) (−0.76)
constant 1.08∗ ∗ ∗ 0 1.84∗∗∗
(2.88) (.) (3.99)
N 96 91 90
w-in R2 0.06 0.36 0.53
between R2 0.83 0.84 0.63
overall R2 0.81 0.83 0.63
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 15: Informal institutional legacy in Latin America
over time
years 1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15
informal inst. legacy 0.64∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗
(1.98) (0.98) (0.82)
oppos. party autonomy 0.04 −0.15 0.12
(−1.57) (−2.60) (2.05)
accountability −1.33∗∗∗ −0.65 −1.76∗∗∗
(−5.27) (−5.77) (−8.09)
capacity 0.20 −0.34∗ 0.22
(1.25) (−2.51) (1.13)
low-mid income 0.05∗ 0 0
(0.11) (.) (.)
mid-high income −0.01 0.08 0.19
(−0.02) (0.67) (1.11)
constant 0 −0.14 0.41
(.) (−0.21) (0.80)
N 73 67 61
w-in R2 0.32 0.10 0.16
between R2 0.88 0.71 0.68
overall R2 0.87 0.69 0.69
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 16: Informal institutional legacy in Africa
over time
years 1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15
informal inst. legacy 0.41∗ 0.32 0.35
(2.03) (1.81) (1.36)
oppos. party autonomy 0.02 −0.46 0.07
(0.17) (−2.24) (0.17)
accountability 0.62∗ 0.11 −0.20
(2.04) (0.76) (−0.54)
capacity −0.70∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗ −0.17
(−3.65) (−3.00) (−1.42)
low-mid income −0.12 −0.03 0.04
(−1.38) (−0.74) (0.60)
mid-high income 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
constant −1.40∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.14
(−3.85) (−0.06) (−0.25)
N 73 67 61
w-in R2 0.36 0.48 0.09
between R2 0.28 0.15 0.45
overall R2 0.38 0.13 0.52
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 17: Robustness test no. 1
Europe Latin America Africa
informal inst. index 0.24∗∗∗ −0.01 0.17∗∗∗
(11.92) (−0.25) (8.69)
electoral comp. index −0.07 0.04 −0.08∗
(−1.75) (1.52) (−3.23)
capacity 0.00 −0.00 −0.04∗∗∗
(0.44) (−0.61) (−4.00)
judicial constraints on exec. −0.17 −0.26 −0.05
(−3.33) (−8.42) (−0.87)
low-mid income 0.76∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ −0.01
(16.52) (20.72) (−1.07)
mid-high income 0.74∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0
(15.81) (21.15) (.)
pol. violence & purges −0.00 −0.00 0.01∗
(−0.52) (1.74) (2.12)
informal inst. index : electoral comp. index −0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ −0.09∗
(−4.44) (5.30) (−2.43)
constant 0 0 0.68∗∗∗
(.) (.) (15.33)
N 322 264 152
w-in R2 0.78 0.78 0.73
between R2 0.91 0.86 0.61
overall R2 0.91 0.86 0.60
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 18: Corruption in Europe (post-transition years 1-15)
exec. bribery leg. corruption
informal inst. index 0.88∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(16.39) (11.02)
accountability 0.61∗∗∗ 0.05
(6.60 (0.45)
capacity 0.10∗ −0.02
(3.53) (0.35)
low-mid income 2.23∗∗∗ 0
(−3.94) (.)
mid-high income 0 −0.20∗∗∗
(.) (−2.51)
pol. violence & purges −0.01 0.01
(−0.55) (0.54)
informal inst. index:accountability 0.11∗ −0.11
(2.24) (−1.91)
constant 3.23∗∗∗ 3.33∗∗∗
(4.57) (6.01)
N 328 322
w-in R2 0.78 0.55
between R2 0.81 0.82
overall R2 0.85 0.79
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 19: Corruption in Latin America (post-transition years 1-15)
exec. bribery leg. corruption
informal inst. index 0.96∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(10.59) (3.43)
accountability 0.91∗∗∗ −0.16
(6.72) (−0.74)
capacity 0.14∗ 0.05
(2.09) (0.44)
low-mid income 3.20∗∗∗ 3.68∗∗∗
(10.11) (5.94)
mid-high income 3.10∗∗∗ 3.44∗∗∗
(10.07) (5.68)
pol. violence & purges 0.01 0.00
(0.46) (0.14)
informal inst. index:accountability 0.30∗ −0.16
(4.33) (−1.91)
constant 0 0
(.) (.)
N 264 264
w-in R2 0.78 0.10
between R2 0.92 0.49
overall R2 0.90 0.44
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 20: Corruption in Africa (post-transition years 1-15)
exec. bribery leg. corruption
informal inst. 0.82∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗
(5.47) (15.87)
accountability 0.18 −0.34∗
(1.12) (−2.25)
capacity 0.06 0.25∗∗
(0.76) (3.20)
low-mid income 0.05 −0.12
(0.86) (−2.42)
pol. violence & purges −0.05 −0.06
(−1.26) (−1.22)
informal inst. index:accountability 0.74∗∗∗ −2.65∗∗∗
(3.47) (−13.11)
constant 4.90∗∗∗ 5.15∗∗∗
(4.45) (4.11)
N 152 152
w-in R2 0.71 0.74
between R2 0.07 0.49
overall R2 0.16 0.44
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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